

Debate

From International to Global Development: New Geographies of 21st Century Development

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ABSTRACT

Recent claims of 21st century global convergence and the ‘rise of the South’ suggest a profound and ongoing redrawing of the global map of development and inequality. This article synthesizes shifting geographies of development across economic, social and environmental dimensions, and considers their implications for the ‘where’ of development. Some convergence in aggregate development indicators for the global North and South during this century challenge, now more than ever, the North–South binary underlying international development. Yet convergence claims do not adequately capture change in a world where development inequalities are profound. Between-country inequalities remain vast, while within-country inequalities are growing in many cases. Particular attention is given here to exploring the implications of such shifting geographies, and what those mean for the spatial nomenclature and reference of development. This article concludes by arguing for the need, now more than ever, to go beyond international development considered as rich North/poor South, and to move towards a more holistic global development — where the global South remains a key, although not exclusive, focus.

INTRODUCTION: NEW GEOGRAPHIES OF DEVELOPMENT

A variety of recent research suggests that we are currently witnessing a profound and ongoing redrawing of the global map of development. According

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to some interpretations, income inequality across all individuals in the world has fallen over the last couple of decades — the first such decline since the industrial revolution two centuries ago (Bourguignon, 2015; Milanovic, 2016). At the same time, various new geographies of development have been identified since the turn of the millennium, across several spheres such as wealth, middle classes, poverty, health, environment and others. The ‘rise of the South’ (UNDP, 2013) and a ‘great convergence’ (Baldwin, 2016; Mahbubani, 2013) have been pointed to. Global middle classes have grown in prominence according to many accounts, while the proportion of the world population living in extreme poverty has fallen dramatically by official measures. In consequence of such trends, the World Bank declared (in April 2016) that it will no longer distinguish between developed and developing countries in its annual World Development Indicators. This follows on from the Sustainable Development Goals, agreed in 2015, being formulated for all, not just ‘developing’, countries. Yet, at the same time, increasing attention has been given to the growth of inequality *within* many countries in both the global North and global South (ISSC et al., 2016; OECD, 2011; Ravallion, 2014; World Bank, 2016).

A vibrant debate has emerged over the causes of a reduction in between-country inequalities, and the relative growth of within-country differences, in the composition of various indicators of global inequality. The diffusion of knowledge has been highlighted as a force for economic convergence across countries (Piketty, 2014), including through the emergence of global value chains enabled by information and communications technologies (Baldwin, 2016). In relation to increasing inequality within countries, factors which affect most countries have centred around globalization (Bourguignon, 2015; Milanovic, 2016), together with skill-biased technological change. The returns to capital exceeding economic growth have been another source for growing inequality, especially in the global North (Piketty, 2014). Others, however, have placed a greater emphasis on national policy choices around taxation and transfers, as well as policies shaping health and education, pointing to heterogeneity across countries (Atkinson, 2015; Ravallion, 2017). Ultimately, it is difficult to adequately distinguish between factors such as globalization, technological change or the rise in top-executives’ compensation, as has been noted (e.g. Milanovic, 2016). The debate has been wide-ranging, including on whether some of the trends in between- and within-country inequalities are zero-sum (e.g. China’s growth, and the accompanying trade ‘shock’ in the United States), or whether both types of inequalities can be addressed simultaneously (e.g. through tackling global public goods problems — pandemics, climate change or international co-ordination to tackle tax evasion) (Rodrik, 2017).

What do such shifting geographies mean for the ‘where’ of development? To what extent does between-country ‘convergence’ adequately reflect the contemporary map of development? Should the global South still be seen as the key locus of development challenges, or do debates on development need


to give greater attention to inequalities within the global North? We suggest that, more than at any time over the last century, the contemporary global map of development appears increasingly at odds with any idealized binary notion of a clear spatial demarcation between First and Third Worlds, ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, or rich and poor, countries. Yet, we also aim to move beyond simplistic claims of global convergence, which ignore continuing vast and shifting global inequalities — both at per capita level between many people in North and South, and (often growing) within many countries. Changing empirical patterns of global inequality and new geographies of development under globalization demand more than ever a shift in thinking from an international development to a truly global development, albeit where the global South would remain a key — although not sole — focus.

This article proceeds as follows. After briefly situating an emphasis on international development with growing inequalities between countries, we engage with various bodies of literature which show some converging trends between North and South when taken in aggregate, albeit with very important limitations. Growing inequalities, or divergence, within many nations are then outlined. We synthesize economic, human and environmental trends using national, regional, continental and income-grouping classifications. Despite the potential limitations of such aggregations (e.g. Jerven, 2013), such patterns are together indicative of broader shifts in the geographies of contemporary development. The future and implications of what we term ‘converging divergence’ (‘converging’ referring to the North–South pattern, ‘divergence’ to within-country inequalities) are then considered — with particular attention to spatial nomenclature, the universalization of development and ultimately the necessity of a conceptual shift from international to global development.

NORTH–SOUTH: THE ‘OLD’ GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

For most of the 19th and 20th centuries, the main feature of income inequalities in the world was the growing differences between countries. At the beginning of the 19th century, various estimates (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2002) suggest that, when taken in aggregate, relatively little gap was present between the two groups of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. As demonstrated in Figure 1 below, income inequalities between countries surged with innovation in Europe and in its offshoots (North America, Australia and New Zealand), and the very significant influence of colonialism. Pritchett (1997) famously characterized the different trajectories of the two groups of countries — hereafter mostly termed global North and global South — as ‘divergence, big time’. A macro-scale geography of a world divided into two — developed and developing countries (within which the former Soviet bloc has usually been awkwardly positioned) — has underlain most mainstream conceptualizations of development.

Figure 1. Growing Importance of Income Inequalities between Countries in 19th and 20th Centuries



Source: Adapted from World Bank (2006: 65).

Much of the broad field of international development, in practice and study, is rooted in addressing these significant inequalities between countries. Although the nomenclature has varied — from Truman’s reference to ‘underdeveloped areas’, to the ‘Third World’ as part of a division into three different worlds in the context of the Cold War (Pletsch, 1981), and to the ‘global South’ following the Brandt Report of 1980 — international development has had a consistent spatial focus. As analysed and critiqued in depth by Escobar (1995), the classic preoccupation of development in research and policy has been how the South would emulate the North and become developed. A clear overlap was understood between poor countries, their people and poverty (with the opposite association for rich countries). A spatial logic based on this simple and exclusive categorization has also been taken as key for understanding development in parts of the so-called developing world itself — in, for example, Third Worldism connected to national liberation projects and the New International Economic Order addressing North–South structural economic relations (Berger, 2004).

Critical scholars have long queried such a simple spatial demarcation of international development. Pletsch (1981: 565), for example, referred to the three worlds scheme as ‘perhaps the most primitive system of classification in our social scientific discourse’. Post-colonial scholarship in particular has criticized North–South binaries, questioning their purpose in providing justification to develop others (Kothari, 2005), and has highlighted the various ways development relates to both North and South (Radcliffe, 2005). The contrasting trajectories of East Asia, on the one hand, and regions elsewhere

in the global South, on the other, have made difficult any articulation of a coherent, underdeveloped, homogeneous South (e.g. Poon and Yeung, 2009; Therien, 1999). It was also noted that gaps in some human development indicators — especially those with an upper bound, for example, life expectancy, schooling enrolment — had begun reducing from the mid-20th century (Kenny, 2005).

Significantly, however, for most of the later 20th century, and with the notable exception of the East Asian ‘miracle’, the global map of development appeared to remain very durable. Korany (1994: 13), for example, claimed that ‘if recent history can prove anything, it proves that North–South bipolarity is — if not the only real thing — at least the most perennial one’. An analysis suggested that between-country (as opposed to within-country) inequalities accounted for 75 per cent of global income inequalities by 2000 (Bourguignon, 2015: 42). The developed–developing country divide persisted to such an extent that the major development framing exercise of the late 20th century, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), was almost completely set within this type of macro-geographical categorization — with targets projected by rich countries for poor countries¹ (Hulme, 2009; Saith, 2006).

21st CENTURY CONVERGENCE?

Synthesized here across economic, human and environmental aspects of development, new geographies of development that have become apparent in this millennium cumulatively point to a dramatic blurring of the aggregate North–South boundary. There is no clear starting point for when this trend began to emerge, with variation across different factors; many started in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, economic liberalization in China and India, and growing economic globalization. More generally, and especially with reference to income, the period around the turn of the millennium has been identified as ‘a watershed moment in the evolution of global inequality’ (Bourguignon, 2015: 28). Here we broadly refer to the 21st century as our time reference for reviewing this significant geographical shift in development.

Converging Economic Development?

The blurring of the North–South boundary has attracted particular attention in relation to economic trends, with references to ‘a new world order with a more diffuse distribution of economic power’, a ‘new geography of growth’ (OECD, 2015a: 3), the ‘rise of the South’ (UNDP, 2013) and a ‘great con-

1. Of the eight MDGs, seven were exclusively focused on poor countries.

Table 1. Population Share (%) in the Global South by Daily Consumption Level, 1990, 1999 and 2013

Year	1990	1999	2013
<US\$ 1.90	49.2	33.4	13.4
US\$ 1.90–5	37.4	42.9	40.0
US\$ 5–10	12.3	14.9	24.5
>US\$ 10	8.3	8.8	22.9

Note: The regions included are: East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. See also Sumner (2016) for a detailed discussion of these trends.

Source: Authors' construction based on data from the World Bank's PovcalNet (<http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povOnDemand.aspx>).


vergence' (Baldwin, 2016; Mahbubani, 2013). While China and, to a lesser degree, India account for a significant proportion of these shifts, the trends towards convergence are part of a broader new geography that goes well beyond these countries.

For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, a trend of economic convergence between individual world citizens has been identified, from 1988 to the present (Bourguignon, 2015; Milanovic, 2013, 2016; World Bank, 2016). Research on the global income Gini across individuals consistently finds a recent fall — from 69.7 in 1988 to 66.8 in 2008 and 62.5 in 2013 (World Bank, 2016: 81) — driven by reductions in between-country inequality. The extent of, and share apportioned to, within-country inequality has increased (Milanovic, 2016). Highly populous China and India are recognized as major drivers of this declining gap in population-weighted incomes across countries (e.g. World Bank, 2016: 69), but sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have also played a role in the 2000s (Bourguignon, 2016: 44).

As classified by the World Bank at US\$ 1.90 consumption per day, the total numbers and also the share of the world population living in extreme poverty have fallen dramatically (Table 1). The absolute number so living peaked at 2 billion in the 1970s and has since fallen to less than 800 million (by 2013). The total share of population in the global South who have a daily consumption level of less than US\$ 1.90 has fallen from 49.2 per cent in 1990 to 13.4 per cent in 2013, with a corresponding increase in those with greater than US\$ 5 per day in consumption.

Especially in the 21st century (when its share increased from 22.5 per cent in 2000 to 34.1 per cent in 2015), the aggregate group of countries classified by the World Bank as low income (LICs) and middle income (MICs) has begun to earn a much larger share of global GDP (see Figure 2). Such an increase is led by China, India and Brazil — whose share of global GDP, only 4.6 per cent in 1960, and still just 6.6 per cent in 1990 and 9.3 per cent in 2000, has almost doubled this century to 18 per cent by 2015. Significantly for LICs and MICs, especially given their substantial share of global population, their share of GNI per capita (PPP) has also grown, although only to a small degree. Average income per capita in LICs and

Figure 2. Share of Global GDP (constant 2010 US\$), 1990–2015




Source: Authors’ construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators (<https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>).

MICs as compared with HICs decreased from 18.2 per cent in 1990 to 15.3 per cent in 1999 and 2000, but then increased to 20.5 per cent by 2014.

The share of the world’s countries officially designated, by the World Bank, as being low income has fallen by more than half, from 30.4 per cent in Financial Year (FY) 2000 to 14.3 per cent by FY 2017 (see Figure 3). Notably a number of countries have ‘transitioned’ from LIC to MIC status, including some highly populous emerging economies (e.g. China, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Vietnam), some formerly centrally-planned economies (e.g. Albania), and some less-populous countries (e.g. Mongolia and Nicaragua). With greater wealth in parts of the global South, the number of countries that are highly dependent on aid has fallen significantly — more than halving from a peak of almost 50 per cent of all LICs and MICs having a net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) >9 per cent of GNI in the early 1990s, to 2015, when fewer than 30 countries are in such a situation (see also Sumner, 2016). Yet many people in extreme poverty live in what are classified as middle-income countries (74 per cent in 2008, compared to 23 per cent in 1990) as part of a ‘new geography of global poverty’ (Kanbur and Sumner, 2012; Sumner, 2012). Although the meaning of the boundaries between low and middle income remains debatable, with many countries classified as middle income having (relatively) quite low incomes, the trajectories nevertheless appear to have changed.

Figure 3. Classification of Countries of the World by Income Grouping, 1987–2015




Source: Authors' construction based on World Bank Country Analytical History (<http://go.worldbank.org/U9BK7IA1J0>).

Alongside the growth in MICs, the rise of a 'global middle class' has also been identified (e.g. Sumner, 2016; UNDP, 2013). However, projections of a dramatic shift in its location towards the global South need to be treated with some caution. Although many in the global South have moved out of extreme poverty, most are still living on relatively low incomes and are thus vulnerable to falling back into extreme poverty, despite increasingly being categorized as within the middle class (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2014). In some contrast, as well as having a growing presence in the top 1 per cent of incomes worldwide (Anand and Segal, 2017), citizens of developing countries are increasingly prominent in lists of extreme wealth. Their share of people listed on the Forbes World Billionaires List has increased from 16.7 per cent in 2001 to 37.1 per cent in 2016 (see Figure 4 below).

Collectively such trends have led to a transition in the world income distribution, from a twin-peak pattern (Quah, 1996), with modal peaks (in 1988) around US\$ PPP 400 and another at US\$ PPP 8,000, to a single peak — at around US\$ PPP 3,000 — by 2008. According to the interpretation of Lakner and Milanovic (2016: 225), the very richest people in the world benefited most during 1988 to 2008, while the global middle class in emerging market economies also benefited in relative terms. Those who relatively lost out on any gain in income were the very poorest 5 per cent and the global upper middle class (between 75th and 90th percentiles on the global income distribution). Indeed, the percentiles of the global income distribution which did best in terms of percentage gain in real income from 1988 to 2008 were

Figure 4. Extreme Wealth: Share of US\$ Billionaires 2001 and 2016



Note: Nationality of billionaire classified according to UNCTAD’s classification of developed/transition and emerging economies.


Source: Authors’ construction based on data from Forbes annual list of The World’s Billionaires. See www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/ (accessed 15 January 2017). For the 2001 list, see http://stats.areppim.com/listes/list_billionairesx01xwor.htm (accessed 15 January 2017).

90 per cent comprised of Asians, while of the least successful, 86 per cent were from ‘mature economies’, that is, the global North (see Figure 5).

Converging Human Development?

To what extent are such trends, which indicate a turnaround in between-country economic inequalities, present for other aspects of development? Although often as part of longer running trends than those for income presented above (see Kenny, 2005), some declines are evident in the gaps between countries across key health and education indicators. In relation to the Human Development Index (HDI) since the 1980s, countries in the low and medium human development categories have had, on average, greater improvement. The population categorized as living in low human development has fallen considerably, from 3 billion in 1990 to just over 1 billion in 2014 (UNDP, 2013). In human development indicators such as literacy, years of schooling, mortality and life expectancy, where there is a clear upper bound which limits the continued growth of the global North (unlike, for example, income or carbon emissions per capita), some converging trends are now evident.

Figure 5. The ‘Elephant Graph’: Relative Gain in Real per Capita Income by Global Income Level, 1988–2008



Note: Gain in per capita income measured in 2005 international \$. Gains were greatest at A (close to the 50% percentile) and C (the top 1%), but lowest at B (mostly composed of rich world lower middle class). Source: Milanovic (2016: 11).


Health

The gap in average basic health indicators, including life expectancy and mortality rates, between HICs, on one hand, and LICs and MICs, on the other, has reduced during the latter decades of the 20th century and into the 21st century. In life expectancy, the gap has continued to narrow — with figures of 68.5 (HICs) and 47 (LICs and MICs) years in 1960, then 77.6 and 65.4 in 2000, and 80.6 and 69.6 years by 2014 — almost a halving of the gap in half a century (see Figure 6).

In the case of the overall under-5 mortality rate per 1,000 live births, the LICs and MICs’ rate has fallen to one quarter of its 1960 level, and has now reached the level the current HICs were at then. Significantly, sub-Saharan Africa is part of this trend as its under-5 mortality rate has dropped dramatically (from 154.8 to 83.2 per 1,000) over 2000–2015. The maternal mortality rate in LICs and MICs has also fallen considerably — from 425 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 376 in 2000 (an 11.5 per cent fall from 1990) to 237 in 2015 (a 44.2 per cent fall from 1990).

In relation to disease, the classic binary association of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) (e.g. heart disease, diabetes, cancer) with developed countries and communicable diseases with developing countries has significantly broken down (Frenk et al., 2014). With life expectancies increasing, NCDs have risen globally, with the majority of their incidence now found in LICs

Figure 6. Life Expectancy (years), 1960–2014




Source: Authors' construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators (<https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>).

and MICs — where approximately 80 per cent of deaths from NCDs occurred in 2010 (Lozano et al., 2012). Whereas cancers were once associated with HICs, now a major burden is in LICs and MICs (Farmer et al., 2010). As with other indicators, such trends have prompted convergence claims. For example, Frenk et al. (2014: 94) suggest that: ‘with the important exception of sub-Saharan Africa, in health terms developed and developing countries have become more alike than different’. The trend in types of disease incidence has prompted Jamison et al. (2013) to suggest that there is now potential for a ‘grand convergence’ in health within a generation, with infectious, child and maternal mortality rates being reduced to universally low levels. Nevertheless, it is important not to overlook the persistence of substantial differences between LICs/MICs and HICs, such as for cardiovascular care (Gaziano et al., 2010), as well as in cancer care (Farmer et al., 2010), pain control and palliative care (Knaul et al., 2015).

Education

North–South gaps in educational enrolment have also declined considerably, a trend some date to as far back as 1870 (Morrisson and Murtin, 2013; also Kenny, 2005). The global primary school enrolment rate has increased from 24 per cent in 1870 to 82 per cent in 2010, and is now approaching universal coverage (Dorius, 2013; Pritchett, 2013). Although illiteracy remains substantial in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, affecting over

Figure 7. Average Educational Enrolment in 'Advanced' and 'Developing' Countries, 1950–2010



Source: Authors' construction based on Barro and Lee (2013) dataset. Advanced includes 24 countries and developing 122. Trend line based on observation at decadal-intervals.

one third of the population in both those regions in 2010 (Morrisson and Murtin, 2013: 288), literacy globally has increased from 36 per cent of the world population in 1950 to 82 per cent by 1999 and 85 per cent by 2014 (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2016).

Based on enrolment rates, low-education nations are catching up, and this is expected to continue (Dorius, 2013: 171; and see Figure 7). The average gap of 4.1 years of education (in 2010) between the population aged over 15 in 'developing' and 'advanced' countries has narrowed by one year since 1970 — being limited by the greater enrolment in tertiary education in the 'advanced' countries (Barro and Lee, 2013: 188). Education inequalities remain vast in enrolments at secondary level (although with 45 per cent global coverage in 2010, compared to 20 per cent in 1960), as well as at tertiary level, which only 10 per cent of the world population have completed (Dorius, 2013; Morrisson and Murtin, 2013: 286). Yet, the average person in developing countries now receives more years of schooling than the average person in developed countries did in 1960 (Pritchett, 2013). Some have further suggested that improvements in literacy rates have arguably led to a more general decline in world inequality in human capital (e.g. Morrisson and Murtin, 2013: 288).

On a more cautionary note, however, education trends based on cognitive attainment rather than years of schooling are not as clear in displaying a converging trend (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008; Pritchett, 2013). One analysis has suggested that 'in terms of cognitive skills, little clos-

ing of the gaps between developed and developing countries has occurred' (Hanushek, 2013: 211). The 2015 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test scores for student attainment in science, mathematics and reading — conducted in OECD and selected partner countries — still show considerable gaps in average achievement.


Converging Environment?

Using carbon emissions as a primary indicator of environmental impact, declining differences between countries in the global North and South may be found in the 21st century. Historically, higher carbon emissions have been associated with the global North. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has since 1992 distinguished differential responsibilities between 'developed' or 'Annex 1' countries, who need to 'take the lead' in reducing carbon emissions, and developing countries, who would follow. Yet, given that much of the inequality in per capita CO₂ emissions may be attributable to inequalities in incomes (Duro and Padilla, 2006), declines in between-country income inequality may also be expected to be evident in carbon emission trends. Since 2005, total carbon emissions from LICs and MICs have exceeded those from HICs and by 2013 contributed almost 60 per cent of the annual global total. Whereas HICs made almost two and a half times more annual 'contribution' to global CO₂ emissions than LICs and MICs in 1960, this ratio had fallen to 1.27 by 1990 and to 1.23 by 2000. A further dramatic switch in share has occurred since — to only 0.62 by 2013.

Emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil, have played a major role in contributing to the share of global emissions associated with LICs and MICs (Viola and Basso, 2016) — increasing from 10.1 per cent in 1960 to 19.3 per cent in 2000 and to 35.7 per cent by 2013. This trend has been most dominated by China, whose share has increased from 8.3 per cent of the global total in 1960 to 13.8 per cent in 2000 to 28.6 per cent by 2013. In 2006, China surpassed the US as the world's largest emitter of CO₂ and by 2013 contributed just short of double the United States, total emissions. Asia now accounts for as much annual total carbon emissions as Western Europe and North America combined.

Big gaps nevertheless remain in the levels of emissions per capita (Oxfam, 2015), with HICs still contributing significantly more — just over 3 times greater — than LICs and MICs (see Figure 8). From 7.5 and 1 metric tons (mt) per capita for HICs/LICs and MICs respectively in 1960, by 2000 such figures were 12.2 and 2.1 mt. Since then a further slight convergence has occurred — the emissions per capita of HICs had declined to 11.0 mt in 2013, while those for LICs and MICs have increased by almost 75 per cent to 3.5 mt per capita (driven particularly by China).

Figure 8. CO₂ Emissions, 1960–2013 (metric tons per capita)



Source: Authors' construction based on World Bank World Development Indicators (<https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>).

Consumption-based emissions rather than production-based emissions continue to show much greater emissions inequalities. A considerable transfer of emissions occurs through international trade of goods produced in developing countries but consumed in developed countries (Peters et al., 2011). Using consumption-based emissions centred around lifestyle, rather than the production-based emissions of a national economy, results in a different perspective, with the average emissions of North Americans and Europeans increasing by 13 per cent and 41 per cent respectively (for the year 2013) (Chancel and Piketty, 2015: 28).


Even with consumption-based data, however, some aspects of a converging trend can be identified. Overall, global carbon emissions inequalities between individuals are estimated to have decreased from a Theil Index of 0.75 in 1998 to 0.70 in 2013. Such a trend has been driven by a clear reduction in between-country inequalities — from a Theil index of 0.46 in 1998 to 0.35 in 2013, which is attributed especially to the rise of China and other BRIC countries. A breakdown of emissions into those by individuals suggests that the major emitters (the top 10 per cent who contribute 45 per cent of global emissions) live on all continents, with a third from developing and emerging economies. Western Europe, North America, Japan and Australia are estimated to now account for less than 50 per cent of all emissions since the industrial revolution at the turn of the 19th century (Chancel and Piketty, 2015: 15). Thus, for carbon dioxide a 'new geography of global emitters' can be identified, necessitating further climate action that is global in scope (Chancel and Piketty, 2015).

Limits of Global Convergence

From a starting point of a great gap, or divergence, between the two macro world regions, this millennium has thus witnessed nascent converging trends which are represented in economic, human and environmental indicators. One further manifestation of these trends may be found in various recent surveys demonstrating patterns of greater optimism about future life prospects in lower-income countries and greater pessimism in higher-income countries (see Figure 9).


Yet, despite such significant changes in the trajectory of global inequality, it would be almost impossible to erase a near two-century long ‘divergence, big time’ of between-country inequality in a period of 15 or 25 years. For the most part, development indicators still reflect noteworthy inequality across individuals in the global North and South, with a significant ‘premium of citizenship’ for those living in the global North. For example, the poorest Americans are at the 50th percentile of world income distribution (Milanovic, 2013: 206), still far above the poorest of the poor in absolute terms. More than half of an individual’s income can thus be predicted based on their country of residence (Milanovic, 2013). In 2008, only a 23 per

Figure 9. Children Will Be Better off – Worse off than their Parents



Source: Authors’ construction. Data on belief whether children will be better off are from the Pew Research Centre (2013). GNI per capita PPP (current international \$) is from World Bank World Development Indicators (<https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>).

Figure 10. Percentage of Absolute Gain in Real per Capita Income Received, by Global Income Level, 1988–2008



Source: Milanovic (2016: 25).

cent reduction in global income inequality would have been found by equalizing incomes within countries but leaving between-country distributions unchanged, whereas equalizing mean incomes across countries would have reduced global inequality by 77 per cent (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016: 215). Absolute gains in income per capita have been very limited for many people, and have overwhelmingly gone to the global top 10 per cent (especially top 5 per cent and 1 per cent).² Gaps between the 15 richest and 15 poorest countries in the world in terms of per capita GDP, and absolute income gaps between the richest 10 per cent and poorest 10 per cent of the world’s population, have grown (Bourguignon, 2015). Meanwhile, the two emerging ‘middles’ (middle-income countries and middle-class people) include many who are relatively low income and whose quality of life is quite precarious. In healthcare treatment, educational achievement and consumption-based carbon emissions, big gaps remain. Some important changes have taken place, yet, as the next section will demonstrate, claims of global convergence — often based on aggregates of North and South or at the country level, fail to take adequate account of patterns of significant and mostly increasing inequality and divergence found within nations.

2. See especially the absolute gains version — Figure 10 — of the more well-known relative gains ‘elephant graph’ shown above in Figure 5.

21st CENTURY DIVERGENCE WITHIN NATIONS


Many who had hoped that somewhat of a blurring of the North–South divide would lead to a much more equal world are likely to be disappointed. Across various aspects of economic development, human development and the environment, some reduction in between-country inequalities is overshadowed by vast, and often growing, inequalities between people who are near-neighbours, living in the same localities, nations and macro world regions. Within-country inequalities are particularly significant given that those living in spatial proximity are usually especially sensitive to welfare contrasts (Milanovic and Roemer, 2016). Bearing in mind that the human and environmental indicators can be somewhat more difficult to assess than those for the economic dimensions, this section explores some indicative divergence trends within countries in the global North and South.

Economic Development: Divergence

Despite aspects of convergence between countries in the North and South, economic inequalities within countries have persisted and have often been accentuated over the last 25 years. Across wealth, income and consumption, and evident in both North and South, rising inequalities within countries have been highlighted in, for example, the 2016 World Social Science Report (ISSC et al., 2016), with both the World Bank (2016) and the International Monetary Fund (Ostry et al., 2016) warning of the consequences. Within-country inequality actually rose rapidly in the last decade of the 20th century — from a population-weighted Gini index of 34 in 1988 to 40 in 1998, before falling back to 39 in 2013 (see Figure 11). About two-thirds of 65 countries (with data available) had higher within-country inequality in 2011 compared to 1988 (Milanovic and Roemer, 2016: 110). Although the number of countries in which within-country income inequality declined between 2008 and 2013 was actually twice the number with widening inequality (World Bank, 2016: 11), the within-country relative share of global inequalities has grown. Such trends raise possibilities of ‘a partial substitution of inequality within countries for the inequality between countries’ (Bourguignon, 2016: 42).

Increasing income inequality within the global North has been widely noticed (OECD, 2011, 2015b). Many in the global North have been left out of income growth since 1990 (Milanovic, 2016). The average Gini index for income inequality in OECD countries increased by almost 10 per cent from 0.29 to 0.32 from the mid-1980s until the late 2000s (OECD, 2011). Likewise, 18 of 23 OECD countries had an increase in within-country inequality between the mid-1980s and 2013 (OECD, 2015b: 24). The exceptions among OECD countries include Belgium, Spain and Italy — where wages and standards of living have fallen more recently (Bourguignon, 2015: 53).

Figure 11. Global Income Inequality 1988–2013



Source: World Bank (2016: 10).

Within developing countries, income inequalities have also been found to be higher than in the 1980s (Ravallion, 2014), although with considerable regional variation. Decomposing total inequality within the global South, within-country differences were found to account for 47 per cent in 2010, an increase from 31 per cent in 1981 (Ravallion, 2014: 852). Despite high growth within the global South, the ‘consumption floor’ (the permanent consumption level, i.e. standard of living, of the poorest stratum) was found to have fallen from 22 per cent of the overall mean of household consumption per person in developing countries in 1981 to 13 per cent in 2011 (Ravallion, 2016: 153).

China, India and Russia are prominent examples of countries with rising domestic income inequalities over the last three decades (see, for example, ISSC et al., 2016). Various estimates for China suggest a rise in the income Gini coefficient from approximately 30 in 1980 to approximately 40 in 2000, to the high 40s by 2008, but with a subsequent drop by a couple of points (presented in Zhuang and Shi, 2016: 2; see also ISSC et al., 2016: 84–88). However, Latin America and Africa — regions where very high within-country Ginis are common — have not seen systematic increases in within-country inequality, with Ginis in many countries in Latin America in particular actually falling in recent years (World Bank, 2016).

Wealth inequalities between individuals in the world are even greater than those for income and consumption (Davies et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014). One analysis based on household balance sheet data for 148 countries for 2000 suggested a global *wealth* Gini coefficient of 0.802, with 29 per cent (or 0.269) of this being attributable to within-country inequality (Davies et al.,

2011: 251). These figures are considerably higher than Milanovic's (2005) estimate for global *income* inequality for 1998 of 17 per cent of a global Gini of 0.641 being within-county. Other analyses of the global distribution of wealth find some extreme concentration or polarization. A recent Oxfam analysis found that just eight people had an amount of wealth equivalent to the bottom half of the world's population, or 3.6 billion people (Oxfam, 2017).

Growing inequality in income from labour and a relative surge in income from capital are widely cited as key factors contributing to a more general growth in inequality (e.g. OECD, 2011; Piketty, 2014). Globally, the share of corporate gross value added paid to labour has declined by five percentage points since 1975, with 42 of the 59 countries for which there are at least 15 years of data showing a decline between 1975 and 2012 (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014: 61–62). In countries for which data are available, higher shares of income are recognized to have gone to the top 1 per cent (World Bank, 2016: 69), but with considerable variation between rich countries in the extent, for example, 20 per cent in the US in the early 2010s compared to 9–10 per cent in Australia. At the extreme level, the top 0.1 per cent's share of national income in the US has increased from roughly 2 per cent in 1980 to around 8 per cent in 2010 (Piketty, 2014: 319).

At the other end of the spectrum, populations living precariously have also been identified, to such an extent that increasing reference is now made to the 'precariat' — a global class in the making according to Standing (2011). They are characterized by precarious jobs, uncertain occupational identities and career pathways and limited rights. This 'vulnerable non-poor' group has been growing in both South and North as many who have escaped extreme poverty by official measures still experience considerable vulnerability and as some jobs that once paid a living wage have become increasingly insecure and precarious.

Human Development: Divergence

While the existence of within-country inequalities in human development is clear (Harttgen and Klasen, 2012), the extent to which they have systematically increased in recent years is less clear given data availability issues (see Bourguignon, 2015: 68–69). Given that within-country income differences have been found to have damaging health and social consequences, it may be expected that growing economic inequalities would lead to growing health inequalities (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2015). Some preliminary evidence presented below suggests that inequalities in health and education within some countries may be increasing.

A wide variety of within-country inequalities are present in health in both the global South and North. In the US, life expectancy gaps have been widening between higher and lower income people for a few decades

(Bosworth et al., 2016; Chetty et al., 2016), while in Russia the gap in life expectancy at age 20 between university and non-university educated people was found to have increased since the early 1990s (WHO, 2008: 33). In an extreme example of differences in life expectancy from within the UK, a 28-year gap was found between people in different parts of the city of Glasgow (CSDH, 2008). Rates of avoidable infectious disease, maternal mortality and under-5 mortality are higher in rural than urban settings and for poorer than wealthier populations in low- and middle-income countries (Jamison et al., 2013: 1910). For example, under-5 mortality rates were estimated to be up to 60 per cent higher in rural areas in LICs and MICs during the period 2001–10 (Jamison et al., 2013). Another analysis has noted that, in the first decade of the 21st century, for every developing country that managed to reduce inequalities in mortality rates, three experienced an increase (Vandemoortele, 2011).

Within-country inequalities are also widely identified in education (UNESCO, 2016). Access to, and quality of, education is highly linked to inequality in income per capita (World Bank, 2016: 138). One analysis suggests that within (rather than between) country differences account for 77 per cent of the inequalities in years of schooling in 2010, an increase from 72.5 per cent in 1990 and 58 per cent in 1950 (Morrisson and Murtin, 2013: 292). Significant within-country inequalities in educational achievement have also been detected. PISA 2015 results show that a vast majority (91.6 per cent) of countries included have a greater gap in average science score between students in the top socio-economically ranked quarter and those in the bottom, than the differences between OECD and non-OECD partners. In 22 of 35 (62.9 per cent) non-OECD partner countries, the top quarter of students have a higher average science score than that of the bottom quarter-performing students in the OECD area (OECD, 2016). PISA 2015 results do not, however, present a clear trend as to whether such inequalities are increasing or not (see also UNDP, 2014 for a similar finding on education more broadly). One study (Reardon, 2011) found a widening educational achievement gap in the US — 30–40 per cent larger for children born in 2001 than 25 years earlier — and suggests that this gap has been growing for at least 50 years.

Environment: Divergence

Data on environmental inequalities are still emerging and are particularly limited for within-country trends, with most analyses focused on between-country differences. In a detailed decomposition of within- and between-country components, Chancel and Piketty (2015) attempted the difficult task of estimating consumption-based emissions across individuals. They detect huge global inequalities — a ‘10:50’ relationship whereby the top 10 per cent of emitters make close to 50 per cent of emissions and the bottom 50 per

cent contribute only about 10 per cent. In their analysis, the within-country Theil index moved from 0.29 to 0.35 between 1998 and 2013 — indicating a rise in inequality. In contrast, the global Theil between individuals fell from 0.75 in 1998 to 0.70 in 2013, with the estimate of the share of within-country inequalities having risen considerably — from 39 per cent to 50 per cent of the global inequality in emissions. Although estimates of the between-country component vary according to the income to CO₂ elasticity, Chancel and Piketty's (2015) best estimate suggests within- and between-country inequalities to be equal. A recent analysis of global methane (CH₄) and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from 1970 to 2008 suggests a possible longer-term pattern of growing within-country inequalities, to such an extent that they are now more significant than those between countries (Sauter et al., 2016).

WHITHER 'CONVERGING DIVERGENCE'?

The trend that we synthesize across various indicators, of declining between-country inequality and of within-country inequality comprising a growing share of global inequalities, refers to a relatively short period. Various analyses suggest that some reduction in gaps between countries in the North and South will continue, alongside a growing relative importance of within-nation aspects of inequality. For example, as other countries and regions grow, Piketty predicts that during the 21st century the European-American share of global GDP will continue to fall, from the 50 per cent of 2010 to 20–30 per cent by the year 2100, a level which would be similar to that which the region had at the start of the 19th century (Piketty, 2014: 59). He has suggested that 'all signs are that this phase of divergence in per capita output is over and that we have embarked on a period of convergence' between rich and poor countries (*ibid.*: 61; see also Bourguignon, 2015: 120; Milanovic, 2016: 212). The UNDP's projections for the global South's share of the global middle class population — albeit using a very low threshold for 'middle class' — suggests a continuing increase from 58 per cent in 1990 to more than 80 per cent by 2030 (UNDP, 2013: 14). Whereas poverty is expected to be an enduring challenge for countries that fall within the middle-income categorization (Sumner, 2012), between-country gaps in some other characteristics, for example the quantity (if not quality) of education, are expected to decrease (Dorius, 2013). Greater convergence in income across countries may reasonably be expected to continue to link to a reduction in between-country CO₂ inequalities, mainly due to a greater increase in developing economies, emissions (Chancel and Piketty, 2015).

While Piketty (2014) suggested that within-country income inequalities may continue to increase, Milanovic (2015) points to Kuznets waves of increasing and then decreasing inequality shaped by redistribution measures. Nevertheless, even if degrees of inequality within countries were to stay

the same, if converging trends between- countries continue, the relative importance of the within-country aspect of global inequalities increases. Such a trend is of significance given that within-country inequalities, possibly underestimated (Bourguignon, 2015: 128), have been claimed to carry greater relative weight than between-country inequalities (e.g. Milanovic and Roemer, 2016). ‘Converging divergence’ can be expected to continue to have resonance.

IMPLICATIONS OF NEW MAPS OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM INTERNATIONAL TO GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT?

Shifting patterns of global inequality — falling somewhat between countries, and relatively rising within countries — challenge many dominant ideas about development — including some aspects of its nomenclature and spatial reference. The empirical trends outlined above support arguments that a reformulation is necessary. Moving from international to global development is a recognition that we live in ‘one world’ — albeit with major inequalities — and not in a ‘North’ or ‘South’ or in First and Third Worlds.

Beyond Rich North and Poor South

Patterns of ‘converging divergence’ pose questions about the utility of mega-regional spatial demarcations of development levels. They also render untenable an exclusive association of development with any assumed synonymy of poor countries and poor people. Such critiques are not new (for example, Dirlik, 2004; Harris, 1986; Hettne, 1995; Therien, 1999) and many have suggested abandoning the terms ‘Third World’ and ‘global South’. Yet, given that new ‘maps of development’ are emerging (e.g. Sidaway, 2012) this century, calls to move beyond macro-scale spatial categorizations of development have grown more frequent and have found expression in the World Bank’s removal (from 2016) of the classification of developed and developing countries in the World Development Indicators.

Two differing response paths are prominent in relation to nomenclature. One approach involves mostly retaining the meaning of the terms North (as rich/privileged) and South (as poor/marginalized), but switching their spatial reference to potentially being applicable anywhere as part of a shift to a relational understanding from a purely Euclidean and territorial sense of First and Third World or global North and South (e.g. Dirlik, 2004; Sheppard and Nagar, 2004). Such a perspective seeks to account for privilege and prosperity in ‘developing countries’ and for marginalization and relative poverty in ‘developed countries’. Others, however, caution against any retaining of the terms Third World or global South to refer to the poor or marginalized, arguing that that can run a risk of overlooking their progressive mobilization (e.g. Dirlik, 2004) and their relevance in collective organization (e.g.

the G77's role in formulation of the SDGs — Perkins, 2013), and can risk essentializing the parts of the world with which the terms have been most associated (e.g. Sidaway, 2012).

Given the lack of any easy replacement, and the continued presence of significant inter-country inequalities, global North/South and related terms are likely to still be used. A more fruitful line, perhaps, is the increasing attempt to capture greater differentiation at a smaller spatial scale. Such an approach is justified by the persistence, and perhaps even magnification, of some forms of geographically uneven development. As a variety of new categorizations/classifications of countries have emerged within development policy (Fialho and van Bergeijk, 2017; Sumner, 2016), the sub-national scale has attracted particular attention (Perkins, 2013; Sidaway, 2012). Notions of connectivity, peripherality (Fischer, 2015) and enclaves (Sidaway, 2007, 2012) are also increasingly noted as having contemporary relevance. With such work, further research can help deepen understanding of the heterogeneity of development within a wider world.

The Universalization of Development

A changing pattern of inequality leaves untenable any notion of development being simply about developing countries (the poor South) emulating the paths previously taken by developed countries (rich North). Critiques of such developmentalism are not new, yet the blurring of the boundaries between 'developed' and 'developing' countries in the 21st century and the massive inequalities which nonetheless remain, both between and within countries, provide reasons to question such an emphasis, which are arguably at least as powerful as decades of critique. Inequality and relative poverty have long been recognized as issues affecting all countries (de Haan and Maxwell, 1998; Therien, 1999). Other development issues attracting attention as universal include the urban (Parnell, 2016), precarious work (Siegmann and Schiphorst, 2016), local and regional development, and socio-spatial inequality (Pike et al., 2014). The United Nations report on the post-2015 development agenda (UN, 2013) has argued that development should be reframed. It envisages a move from a narrow focus on poverty and inequality in the global South, to more sustainable, inclusive and secure futures, within a universal framing of development through transformation. Especially prominently, the SDGs outline 17 goals which have global relevance (all UN member states have agreed to pursue them), with an emphasis on 'transformation' and sustainability, while the Paris Agreement on climate change (finalized in December 2015) requires commitments by all countries — a global approach.

The framing of development as sustainable development has arguably been a crucial, although not sufficient, step to moving beyond the classic spatial focus of international development. Earlier pleas for sustainable de-

velopment, such as the Brundtland Report of 1987, were framed in the binary of developed and developing world (Perkins, 2013: 1005). Yet the universal frame of reference of the SDGs, agreed in 2015, marks a sharp contrast with the earlier MDG era when the goals, largely set by developed countries, were almost exclusively for developing countries. The process of formulating the SDGs in 2015 was more inclusive of actors from the global South. The G77 (an informal collective of the UN's 130 'developing countries'), and Brazil in particular, played prominent roles in converting the 'post-2015 Development Agenda' into the United Nations General Assembly-agreed Sustainable Development Goals (Bhattacharya and Ordóñez Llanos, 2016; Hulme, 2015).

Encompassing development issues wherever they occur helps address long-expressed frustrations of a separation of research on the global North from that on the global South (e.g. Lewis, 2015; Pollard et al., 2009). Indeed, the SDGs and the broader presence of planetary boundaries provide biophysical limits for 'a "safe operating space" for global societal development' (Steffen et al., 2015: 736) that highlight challenges for all countries. Initial attempts to create indexes of progress towards the SDGs have revealed some notable challenges for HICs, for example on environmental issues, such as climate change (SDG 13), ecosystem conservation (SDG 14 and 15) and sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12), and also on agricultural systems, malnutrition (related to obesity), development cooperation (SDG 17), jobs and unemployment and gender equality (Sachs et al., 2016). The challenge of climate change and environment thus puts considerable emphasis on the global North and on elite populations in terms of where some of the biggest development challenges must be tackled. In such an emphasis, global public goods also come into greater focus — as a collective challenge — with significant global relevance. Key issues include financial stability and arguably taxation cooperation, treatments for serious global diseases, and mitigation of carbon emissions and adaptation to climate change (Alonso, 2012).

Of course, the global South still warrants considerable focus within global development. Any shifting away from an emphasis on the global South might be akin to 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater'. While recognizing that development challenges can be felt anywhere, they vary greatly in priority as 'the mission of universalizing development has not been fulfilled yet' (Arsel and Dasgupta, 2015: 654). A continued emphasis within global development must be attention to the most pressing development challenges, for example, what Collier (2007) called the planet's bottom billion — those who still live in the most severe deprivation, and who are overwhelmingly located in the global South. The SDG Index and its Dashboards, which track progress towards the SDGs, show huge continuing basic needs challenges for low-income countries — in relation to poverty, hunger, health care, education, water and sanitation, jobs and infrastructure (Sachs et al., 2016). But there are also considerable challenges for elites (such as climate change,

taxation), and it is important that we avoid the creation of somewhat arbitrary categorizations, as a result of which people who have escaped from income/consumption poverty, or countries now classified as middle income, are overlooked.

Development cooperation now finds itself within a very different landscape, wherein its characterization as a Western, post-colonial project of rich countries aiding poor countries shaped by a moral geography of charity is undermined. Greater prosperity in some parts of the global South means some countries are effectively in a post-aid landscape, and now have greater relative space to set their own agenda. Domestic redistribution potential has been enhanced (Hoy and Sumner, 2016), if not always capacity or will in implementation. Considerable debate has emerged over the future of aid among traditional donors, some of whom now face considerable domestic challenges (Hulme, 2016; Kanbur and Sumner, 2012; Sumner, 2012, 2016). At the same time, new or 'non-traditional' donors have grown in relative importance (e.g. Mawdsley, 2017). A new prospect of multi-directional cooperation now beckons (Janus et al., 2015). The continuation of development assistance has been persuasively argued, for reasons including large pockets of poverty, spillover effects, the possibilities of knowledge transfer and a moral obligation based on exploitative historical relations (Hulme, 2016; Kanbur and Sumner, 2012). Yet the extent to which development cooperation will now focus beyond poverty to include a wider range of issues such as identified in the SDGs remains unclear.

From International to Global Development

New maps of development give reason to evaluate further the nomenclature, spatial reference and meaning of development. Echoing somewhat an earlier move from international health (tropical medicine) to global health (improving health and equity in health for everyone) (Koplan et al., 2009), we suggest that ultimately a shift from international development to global development is required, as outlined in Table 2 below. Accentuated by the creation of the universal Sustainable Development Goals, increasing reference has been made to what may be thought of as a global development era (e.g. Gore, 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012; Scholte and Söderbaum, 2017; Scott and Lucci, 2015).

Somewhat confusingly, the term 'global development' can be used with different meanings (Horner, 2017). One focuses on vertical *scale*, involving global actors, organizations and processes. For example, Currie-Alder (2016) provides a well-developed elaboration of global development (focused on global interdependencies) as operating in parallel to streams of international development (focused on foreign hotspots) and national development (involving sovereign decisions over improving the human condition at home). Another perspective, favoured here, relates to horizontal *scope*

Table 2. *From International Development to Global Development*

Issue	International Development: ‘Divergence, big time’	Global Development: ‘Converging divergence’
Geographic Focus	Place-specific: synonymous with ‘poor countries’, ‘poor people’ and global South	Universal: Sustainable development issues anywhere – Interconnected (e.g. global public goods) and shared (in both North and South) challenges
Spatial Nomenclature	First-Second-Third Worlds; developed/developing; global North/South	Global convergence, national and sub-national divergence (enclaves, peripherality, connectivity/exclusion)
Prominent Meaning of Development	Modernization and growth: Southern countries becoming like the global North	SDG agenda: transformation, true ‘global development’; sustainability; social justice
Big ‘D’ Development Morality and Actors	Charity and development aid by Northern states, NGOs	Development cooperation by traditional and new donors; multiple domestic and international sources of public and private development finance

Source: Authors’ construction.

— where development is linked to the whole world. In such a framing, global development is an overarching focus, characterized by a number of dimensions that embrace both international (between country) and national (within country) issues. Rather than seeing two alternates, this global development approach (cf. Hettne, 1995 for an early interpretation) may involve aspects of both a ‘one-world’ (Mehta et al., 2006; Singer, 2002) and a ‘bottom billion’ (Sumner, 2011) approach. What global development means ultimately requires much more elaboration, but it is certainly clear that the world is changing well beyond the 20th century international development emphasis on a relatively simple coincidence of ‘poor countries’ and ‘poor people’.

RESPONDING TO THE NEW MAP OF 21st CENTURY GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

As demonstrated by this synthesis of new geographies across economic, human and environmental aspects of development, the North–South aggregate boundary of international development has become increasingly blurred since the turn of the millennium. We believe that the term ‘converging divergence’ may be a more appropriate description of what is now occurring than ‘global convergence’, which does not fully capture the significant inequalities — both between and within countries — which are still present. Claims of convergence can be supported by the aggregate GDP performance of the global South, its growing share of middle class population, aggregate carbon emissions, and the reclassification of countries as middle income, and also by health indicators and educational enrolment. However, these trends mask the substantial gaps that many individuals in the global South still face relative to the ‘citizenship premiums’ from which people in the North

continue to benefit. Moreover, greater heterogeneity is emerging within the global South, while the growing inequalities within many countries are not captured in convergence claims.

The trend of shifting geographies and growing within-country inequalities, along with the global challenge of sustainable development, makes any *exclusive* emphasis of development research and policy on the global South questionable. A focus on international development needs to be replaced by a concept of global development that takes in all countries. In such a context, adaptations are needed to the term North–South, the meaning of development and to development cooperation. At the same time, the continued extent of between-country inequalities implies that such inequalities — the historical focus of international development studies — cannot be abandoned or ignored. A focus on global development must take in the global South, yet recognize that North and South are now becoming somewhat more similar in terms of development, and at the same time accommodate the shifting geographies of the present.

Planet Earth approaching 2020 is a very different place even when compared with the turn of the millennium, and future trends in global inequalities may be as difficult to predict now as they were 20 years ago. Global trade patterns are shifting rapidly, with less dominance by the global North, yet with the potential for new and augmented unevenness, especially within the global South (Horner and Nadvi, forthcoming). In the global North, the fourth Industrial Revolution based on digital communications is attracting considerable hype as a transformative economic paradigm, yet with major concern around its implications for inequality and employment (Schwab, 2016: 3), and its potential for the global South very unclear. However, we believe a consistent priority for global development will be to identify progressive changes in both between- and within-country inequalities (see Rodrik, 2017). The challenges are severe, whether in relation to the economic growth of countries in the global South, greater taxation (cooperation) on capital and high incomes, international migration, social protection or addressing carbon emissions. The danger is of retreating inwards under the rhetorical claim, ‘we’re all developing now, so we have to look after ourselves’, with the consequent neglect of severe deprivation in the world (e.g. the so-called ‘bottom billion’), or, indeed, the risk of not meeting highly-needed carbon emissions commitments such as in the Paris Agreement. With a different socio-spatial manifestation of development prevailing to that which characterized most of the 19th and 20th centuries, the task now — for scholars, policy makers, activists and citizens — is to understand and work towards addressing 21st century global development challenges.

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